A Variation with Risk-Averse Buyers and Demand Uncertainty by Gorelkina, Olga
A Variation with Risk-Averse Buyers and Demand
Uncertainty
Comment
by
Olga Gorelkina∗
1 Introduction
Inspired by Bar-Gill's (2020 [2]) novel twist on the classic Hotelling model,
where buyers misperceive their demands, as well as the preceding analysis of
the monopoly case by the same author (Bar-Gill, 2019 [1]), this note applies his
idea to a slightly diﬀerent setting. In particular, it suggests a model where the
buyers' have imperfect knowledge of the good's value and their location on the
Hotelling line. That is, the variables representing the value and the location
will be treated as random; the buyers will only observe their distribution (or
more speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst two moments of the distribution). The buyers in the
original paper (Bar-Gill, 2020) can be thought of as observing the realizations
of these random variables, while their observation is diﬀerent from the true
realization, upon which the welfare analysis is based. Here, the buyers will
make their purchasing decisions before observing a realization. Another way to
compare both settings would be to say that the buyers don't know that they
don't know in the original paper, while they know that they don't know in
this note. The purpose of this note would be to shed light on whether such a
change of frame can be made while maintaining the basic insights of the paper.
The present analysis does not attempt to match the original model in either its
depth nor completeness. Rather, it oﬀers a variation that hopefully sheds light
on the nature of misperceptions.
The buyers have a mean-variance type utility: their payoﬀs increase in the
expectation of their net payoﬀ and decrease linearly in the variance of such
payoﬀs; the degree of risk aversion may vary (which, as we will see, corresponds
to the magnitude of misperception in the original paper). The expectations are
taken with respect to two variables, that capture the uncertainty - mirroring
the original analysis of common and relative misperceptions. In Section 3 of his
note, the value of the good is treated as a random variable - which corresponds to
the common misperception and can also be referred to as vertical uncertainty.
In Section 4, the buyer's location becomes random instead; this is the analogy
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to the relative misperception, or horizontal uncertainty. A limitation of this
analysis is on the assumption that the solutions are interior. An important
contribution of the original paper is is its speciﬁc focus on corner solutions that
are arguably important in practice.
The focus in this comment is to contribute a supplementary model for the
analysis of misperceptions in a Hotelling model, rather than oﬀer a complete
analysis of consumer surplus and welfare, which is already done in the original
paper. We show that in order to make a transition from the model outlined
here to Bar-Gill's (2020) model of common misperceptions, one would assume
that buyers are risk loving to obtain positive, and risk-averse, to obtain negative
common misperceptions. One would expect the results of the original paper to
apply in these cases.
2 The Model
A buyer's utility is given by u (v − ti (x)− pi), if he buys from ﬁrm i ∈ {1, 2}
at price pi, v is the good's value and ti (x) is the transportation cost and x is
between 0 and 1. The value v and the location x on the Hotelling line may be
uncertain. When they are treated as random variables, the notation becomes
v˜ and x˜, respectively. In either case of uncertainty, the argument of u(·) is a
random variable.
Suppose u is a mean-variance utility function, such that for the random
payoﬀ ξ˜,
u
(
ξ˜
)
= E
[
ξ˜
]
− γVar
[
ξ˜
]
The common misperception would correspond, in this model, to uncertainty
about v, i.e.,
u (v˜ − ti (x)− pi) = ve − γσ2v − ti (x)− pi,
where ve = Ev and σ2v = Varv, i = 1, 2 refers to a ﬁrm.
In contrast, relative misperception would correspond to
u (v − ti (x˜)− pi) = v − tei − γs2i − pi,
where tei = E [ti (x)] and s2i = Var [ti (x)]. Similar to the original article, I will
treat the cases of common and relative misperception in isolation. I will start
with the uncertainty about v, the case of common misperception, that I will
refer to as vertical uncertainty.
3 Vertical Uncertainty
Vertical uncertainty mirrors common misperception in the original paper - it
refers to the uncertainty about the good's value to the customer. The buyer's
subjective expectation of the value is ve and the variance is σ2v .
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3.1 No Price Discrimination
Consider ﬁrm i that sets its uniform price pi to maximize its revenue Ri, deﬁned
as follows.
Ri = (pi − ci)
ˆ 1
0
I
((
EUBi (x) > 0
) ∧ (EUBi (x) > EUBj (x))) dΦ (x)
= (pi − ci)
ˆ 1
0
I
((
ve − γσ2v − pi > ti (x)
)∧
∧ (pj − pi > ti (x)− tj (x))) dΦ (x) (1)
where I (·) is the indicator function that takes value 1 if its argument is true, 0 if
it's false; ∧ is the logical and operator; Φ is the cumulative distribution function
describing the locations of the mass of consumers, x measures the distance from
ﬁrm i, and di ≡ ti − tj is the diﬀerence in transportation costs for a given
consumer, when he buys from ﬁrm i as opposed to ﬁrm j.
Suppose ﬁrst that ve − γσ2v is suﬃciently low, then we have a monopoly
situation (the market is not covered), and therefore, the ﬁrst order condition for
maximization is given by
∂Ri
∂pi
= Φ
(
t−1i
(
ve − γσ2v − pi
))− (pi − ci) φ (t−1i (ve − γσ2v − pi))
t′i (ve − γσ2v − pi)
= 0.(2)
In Bar-Gill (2000), the distribution of locations is uniform, Φ(x) = x, the
Hotelling line has length 1, the transportation cost is linear, t(x) = x, and the
marginal cost of production is zero, ci = 0, for i = 1, 2. In this setting, the ﬁrst
order condition (2) implies
pi =
ve − γσ2v
2
.
Skipping the intermediate case covered in the original paper, suppose that ve−
γσ2v is suﬃciently large, then we have, for the ﬁrst order condition,
∂Ri
∂pi
= Φ
(
d−1i (pj − pi)
)− (pi − ci) φ (d−1i (pj − pi))
d′i (pj − pi)
= 0. (3)
In the setting of the original paper, di = ti − tj = x− (1− x) = 2x− 1 and
thus d−1i (y) =
y+1
2 . Therefore, the ﬁrst order condition (3) becomes
pj − pi + 1
2
= pi ⇔ pi
2
=
pj + 1
2
.
which implies p1 = p2 = 1, the prices do not depend on v
e − γσ2v .
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We conclude that an increase in γ, σ2v , and a decrease in v
e make partial
market coverage more likely. The eﬀect of risk aversion is opposite to the eﬀect
of negative common misperception in the original paper. The case of positive
common misperception is achieved in this model if buyers are risk-loving - in
this case, they overstate their demand for a good with an uncertain value.
Risk loving consumers will buy more often than optimal. In contrast, risk
aversion leads to reduced market coverage.
3.2 Price Discrimination
Ri =
ˆ 1
0
(pi(x)− ci) I
((
EUBi (x) > 0
) ∧ (UBi (x) > UBj (x))) dΦ (x)
=
ˆ 1
0
(pi(x)− ci) I
((
ve − γσ2v − pi(x)− ti (x) > 0
)∧
∧ (pj(x) + tj (x)− ti (x) > pi(x))) dΦ (x)
The analysis is similar to the original paper with the exception that vˆ, the
perceived value, is replaced by ve−γσ2v . Positive misperception thus corresponds
to the case of a risk-loving buyer.
4 Horizontal Uncertainty
In this subsection, I will consider the case of uncertainty about the buyer's own
location x on the Hotelling line. Thus horizontal uncertainty mirrors relative
misperception in the original paper.
4.1 No Price Discrimination
For simplicity, assume a linear transportation cost, ti(x) = x (where x denotes
the distance from ﬁrm i).
Ri = (pi − ci)
ˆ 1
0
I
((
EUBi (x) > 0
) ∧ (EUBi (x) > EUBj (x))) dF (xe)
= (pi − ci)
ˆ 1
0
I
((
v − xe − γs2i > pi
) ∧ (pj − pi > 2xe − 1)) dF (xe)(4)
where the F is the distribution of the expected Hotelling locations xe. Compar-
ing (4) with equation (1) we see that σ2v in (1) is replaced by s
2
i in (4), Φ by F ,
but otherwise the equations are the same. Thus, the analysis would be similar.
If beliefs are consistent and F ≡ Φ we will get the same eﬀects as in the case
of vertical uncertainty. If, however, instead of belief consistency, F ﬁrst-order
stochastically dominates Φ, implying that the buyers overestimate the distance
from i, then we have compound eﬀects of vertical and horizontal uncertainty.
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In addition to the demand-lowering eﬀect of risk aversion, as outlined in 3.1,
we will obtain the eﬀects similar to the relative misperception case studied in
Bar-Gill (2020). In case of overestimation (F FOSD Φ), the eﬀect has the
same direction as risk aversion, causing the consumers to buy less from the ﬁrm
they perceive to be further than it is. If in contrast the buyers underestimate
the distance from ﬁrm i, it works in the same way as risk loving: the demand
of Firm i's product is exaggerated.
4.2 Price Discrimination
In the case of price discrimination, customers will be oﬀered diﬀerent prices
depending on their expected location on the Hotelling line.
Ri =
ˆ 1
0
(pi(x
e)− ci) I
((
EUBi (x) > 0
) ∧ (UBi (x) > UBj (x))) dF (xe)
=
ˆ 1
0
(pi(x
e)− ci) I
((
v − γs2i − pi (x) > xe
) ∧ (pj (x)− pi (x) > 2xe − 1)) dF (xe)
As in the case of price discrimination, we are back to the vertical uncertainty
if beliefs are consistent, i.e., if F ≡ Φ. There are compound eﬀects, as in 4.1 in
the case where one of the distributions dominates the other.
5 Conclusion
This note attempted to translate Bar-Gill's (2020) analysis can to a framework
where the buyers are fully rational. In this framework, common misperception
can be modelled as uncertainty about product value, buyer's risk aversion is
then the analog of negative misperception, whereas negative risk aversion (i.e.,
if buyers are risk-loving) is the analog of positive misperception in the model.
The mapping between relative misperception and the horizontal uncertainty
proposed here is somewhat less straightforward. This is due to the symmetric
eﬀect of uncertainty in the present model when beliefs are consistent. To obtain
the eﬀects similar to Bar-Gill (2020) one would postulate belief inconsistency,
eﬀectively approaching the original setting. This note does not cover welfare
comparisons, where one could expect important diﬀerences between the original
misperception model and the uncertainty. It would be interesting to see further
research exploring the role of misperceptions, and more generally, behavioral
biases within the Hotelling model.
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